The Supreme Court, Boys Markets Labor
Injunctions, and Sympathy Work Stoppages
Arthur B. Smith, Jr.t
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, the Supreme Court ruled
that federal courts may enjoin sympathy work stoppages after, but not before, an arbitratordetermines that the strike or picket line respect violates a
no-strike obligationin the governing collective bargainingagreement. Professor Smith finds the concerns that prompted the Court to restrict the availability of Boys Markets labor injunctions in this manner largely unfounded,
given the possibility of enjoining the strike and ordering the controversy over
the scope of the no-strike clause submitted to expedited arbitration.This
alternative remedy would enhance respect for the collective bargainingagreement, satisfy the conditions for equitable intervention, and avoid the need
forjudicial construction of obscure NationalLabor Relations Board law concerning the protected status of sympathy strikes.

When Congress enacted section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act,' authorizing civil actions in federal courts for breach
of collective bargaining agreements, it did not expressly amend the
anti-injunction provisions of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'
t Assistant Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). The legislative history of section 301 is summarized in H.R. REP.
No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE ISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr, 1947, at 545-46, 570 (1948), and abstracted as an appendix to Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,485546 (1957). For an analysis of the Court's use of this history, see Aaron, The LaborInjunction
Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 292, 342-43 (1963).
2 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as
these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving
fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests
in a labor dispute;
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The extent to which injunctive relief is available to employers under
section 301 for union breaches of collective bargaining contracts
remains unresolved. In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,3
the Supreme Court confronted this problem for the third time since
1970. Justice White, writing for a 5 to 4 majority, concluded that
the compromise between competing policies fashioned in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,4 where the Court authorized equitable intervention in a limited category of breach-ofcontract strikes, should not be extended to permit preliminary injunctive relief against a sympathy work stoppage pending arbitration of the scope of the union's no-strike obligation. The decision
thus marks a departure from the expansion of the Boys Markets
remedy exhibited two terms earlier in Gateway Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers.5
On the surface, the slimness of the Court majority in Buffalo
Forge, and the alignment of the authors of Boys Markets and
Gateway Coal, Justice Brennan and Justice Powell respectively,
with the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, might suggest a significant controversy and a return to the era of SinclairRefining Co.
v. Atkinson.I That 5 to 4 decision, in which Justice Brennan wrote
for the dissent, had precluded federal courts from enjoining breachof-contract strikes, and was overruled by Boys Markets. Neither
opinion in Buffalo Forge questions the continuing vitality of Boys
Markets, however, and the difference between the majority and
minority positions is in fact quite small.
This article examines the soundness of the Buffalo Forge majority's contention that prearbitration injunctions against sympathy
work stoppages and picket line respect would impair the policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes. The analysis concludes that
the Court overlooked significant labor policies that would be furthered by permitting injunctions enforcing union no-strike obliga(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence
the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is
described [in section 103 rendering so-called "yellow dog" contracts nonenforceable].
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
3 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
398 U.S. 235 (1970). See generally Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions and the
Judges: The Boys Market Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 215; Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys
Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability,85 HARv. L. REv. 636 (1972); Note, The New
Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593 (1970).
5 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
6 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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tions,7 and exaggerated the difficulties posed by judicial construction of ambiguous no-strike clauses in preliminary injunction proceedings. These problems, and the fear of unwarranted intrusion
into union-management relations by judicial interpretation of
obscure National Labor Relations Board law concerning the protected status of sympathy strikes and picket line respect, could
largely be eliminated by the use of injunctive orders that do no more
than preserve the status quo pending expedited arbitration of the
scope of a union's no-strike obligation.
I.

THE

Boys MARKETS

COMPROMISE

In Boys Markets the Supreme Court accommodated section 301
and the seemingly absolute anti-injunction strictures of the NorrisLaGuardia Act by invoking the policy developed under section 301
favoring arbitration as a mechanism for settling labor disputes.8 The
Court recognized a limited employer's right to injunctive relief, conditioned on the existence of a "strike... over a grievance which both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate"' and the satisfaction
of ordinary principles of equity. In so ruling, Boys Markets rectified
two aberrations in section 301 law created by Sinclair Refining Co.
v.Atkinson:10 the apparent deemphasis of arbitration as a preferred
For pre-Sinclaircommentary on specific performance of no-strike obligations, see Cox,
Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 247 (1958);
Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 635 (1959); Mendelsohn,
Enforceability of ArbitrationAgreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167
(1956); Rice, A Paradoxof Our NationalLabor Law, 34 MARQ. L. REv. 233 (1951); Stewart,
No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. Rav. 673 (1961); Comment, Labor
Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia,70
YA E L.J. 70 (1960). Post-Sinclaircommentary has focused on the viability of the specific
performance remedy in state courts. See Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts (pts.
1 & 2), 50 VA. L. REv. 951, 1147 (1964); Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and NoStrike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REv. 32 (1969); Note,
Specific Enforcement of No-Strike Clauses: The Enigma of Sinclairv. Atkinson, 19 RUTGERS
L. P~v. 507 (1965).
8 See United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
1 398 U.S. at 254, quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10Criticism of the Court's reasoning and result in Sinclair was extensive and was acknowledged, in part, by the Court in Boys Markets. 398 U.S. at 249 n.18; see, e.g., SECTION
OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw, ABA, REPORT OF SPECIAL ATKINSON-SINcLAIR COMMrITEE 226-44
(1963); Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 292 (1963); Aaron,
Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
1027 (1963); Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia
Marine on the Fabricof NationalLabor Policy, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 980 (1969); Dunau, Three
Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427, 463-68 (1969); Keene, The Supreme Court,
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method of resolving labor disputes, and the frustration of the policy
favoring uniform remedies for breach of collective agreements, since
injunctive relief theoretically remained available in state as opposed
to federal courts."
Both Sinclair and Boys Markets dealt with collective bargaining agreements containing grievance procedures that culminated in
final and binding arbitration.12 These procedures could be invoked
by either party, and applied to all disputes involving the interpretation of the bargaining agreements. Both agreements also contained
express no-strike clauses prohibiting strikes over any matter that
could have been resolved in the grievance-arbitration process. 13 The
employees in both cases struck over disputes with management that
were subject to, and resolvable under, the grievance-arbitration provisions of the collective agreements.14
In Sinclair,Justice Black's majority opinion rejected the argument advanced by some commentators" that a strike in breach of
contract is not a "labor dispute" within the meaning of section 13(c)
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."6 According to Justice Black, because
Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, supra note 7;
Wellington, The No-Strike Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time for a Re-examination, 30
U. Prrr. L. Rav. 293 (1968); Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretationand the Political
Process:A. Comment on Sinclairv. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963). But see Vladeck, Boys
Markets and National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1970) (arguing that Sinclair was
essentially correct insofar as judicial intervention is concerned and that breaches of no-strike
clauses should be treated as prima facie violations of the NLRA subject to Board jurisdiction).
" See text and note at note 98 infra.
12 The grievance-arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement involved
in Sinclair are reproduced in an appendix to the opinion of the Court in a companion case,
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 250-53 (1962). The grievance-arbitration provisions relevant in the Boys Markets case are reproduced in the district court's opinion. 70
L.R.R.M. 3071, 3072-74 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
'1 See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 1961). The no-strike
provisions in Boys Markets were equally broad in scope but were inapplicable if the employer
refused to arbitrate a dispute subject to the grievance-arbitration procedure or failed to abide
by an arbitration award. See 70 L.R.R.M. at 3073.
1, The grievances in Sinclair involved allegedly improper deductions by the employer
from three employees' pay, the refusal of the employer to assign riggers to work alongside
other crafts on certain jobs, the refusal by the employer to employ certain apprentices at craft
level jobs and pay, and an allegedly improper subcontracting of bargaining unit work. See
370 U.S. at 199 n.10. In Boys Markets, the dispute concerned the use of nonunion employees
to rearrange merchandise in the frozen food cases in one of the employer's supermarkets, work
which the union claimed belonged to its members. 398 U.S. at 239.
' See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 7; Rice, supra note 7; Stewart, supra note 7.
" 370 U.S. at 199. The Norris-LaGuardia Act defines the term "labor dispute" in pertinent part as "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 29 U.S.C. § 113(c)
(1970). For an analysis concluding that a strike in breach of contract is a "labor dispute"
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the breach of contract strike was a "labor dispute," section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act applied unless it had been repealed by section 301. He concluded that the anti-injunction provisions had not
been repealed by section 301, and he refused to accept the dissent's
solution accommodating section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act with
the subsequently enacted section 301.17 Consequently, federal courts
were deprived of the power to enjoin strikes in breach of contract.
As he had argued in the Sinclairdissent, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Boys Markets, adopted the proposition that
the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had to
be accommodated with section 301.11 In determining the proper
scope of the accommodation, he focused primarily on the importance of arbitration as an instrument of substantive federal labor
law. Thus, a court's power to issue an injunction was conditioned
on the existence of a grievance-arbitration procedure fully capable
of resolving the dispute that had caused the strike. Justice Brennan
reasoned that a remedial device that did no more than enforce a
union's freely undertaken obligation to arbitrate did not contravene
the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Justice Brennan also emphasized "the devastating implications
for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and their accompanying no-strike obligations if equitable remedies were not available." 9 Noting that an employer's promise to submit disputes to the
process of arbitration is generally given as a quid pro quo for the
union's agreement not to strike, he suggested that employers would
have little incentive to agree to arbitration if the most expeditious
within the meaning of the language quoted above, see United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258,
312-13 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Cases permitting state court injunctions of breaches of contract despite little NorrisLaGuardia acts with provisions identical to section 13(c) of the federal statute, and little
Norris-LaGuardia acts with specific language exempting strikes in breach of collective bargaining agreements from their anti-injunction provisions, are collected in Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts (pt. 1), 50 VA. L. REV. 951, 981 (1964); Keene, supra note 7, at
49 nn.79 & 80; and Note, Specific Enforcement of No-Strike Clauses: The Enigma of Sinclair
v. Atkinson, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 507, 526 (1965).
'7 See Sinclair v. Atkinson Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"The Court relied heavily on precedents under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§
151-188 (1970). 398 U.S. at 251-52. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River
& Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), affirming the issuance of an injunction restraining a strike
in violation of the statutorily imposed duty to arbitrate disputes submitted to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board for resolution. The Court there concluded that the NorrisLaGuardia Act's policy of nonintervention should be accommodated with, and in effect give
way to, the important federal policy of peaceful settlement of railroad labor disputes subject
to NRAB procedures.
" 398 U.S. at 247.
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method of enforcing no-strike obligations-an injunction-was not
available.
This last observation intimated a more general point-that the
collective bargaining process as a whole is weakened by a court's
refusal to order the specific performance of a contractual undertaking. Preserving the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements, of course, is a more inclusive rationale for equitable intervention than the policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes.2 1 Interestingly, before the decision in Boys Markets certain lower courts had
read Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,2' where the Supreme
Court specifically enforced an arbitration agreement, as authorizing
broad authority to specifically enforce all provisions of collective
bargaining agreements.22 These cases in effect adopted an accommodation of section 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act that would
permit injunctions to enforce all union no-strike obligations, rendering the anti-injunction provisions of section 4 virtually inapplicable
in section 301 actions.
Justice Brennan, however, stressed that the holding of Boys
Markets was a "narrow one" that did not undermine the vitality of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.2 Equitable intervention was authorized
only where the work stoppage concerned an issue resolvable in arbitration. Moreover, injunctive relief was not necessarily appropriate
"in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance. 21 4 Quoting
from his dissent in Sinclair, Justice Brennan listed the following
principles to guide courts in issuing labor injunctions:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not
grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and
until it decides that the case is one in which an injunction
would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When
a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance
which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the
District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds
that the contract does have that effect; and the employer
should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining
21 All contract breaches, whether or not they could be resolved by the arbitration provisions of the governing agreement, would be subject to equitable relief under this formulation.
21 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
" See, e.g., Teamsters Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th
Cir. 1960), rev'd, 370 U.S. 711 (1962); Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen, 315 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1963), vacated with instructions to dismiss as moot, 375
U.S. 18 (1963) (accommodating the Norris-LaGuardia Act with the Railway Labor Act).

21398 U.S. at 253.
24 Id. at 254.
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an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the District
Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity-whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or
have been threatened and will be committed; whether they
have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer;
and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of
an injunction than will the union from its issuance.' 5
Clearly, Boys Markets did not establish a general specific performance remedy, but only relaxed the strictures of the NorrisLaGuardia Act for a limited class of breach-of-contract strikes.
However, the Supreme Court's next full decision attempting to accommodate section 301 with the anti-injunction provisions significantly expanded the availability of Boys Markets relief.
II.

GATEWAY COAL: EXTENSION OF THE COMPROMISE

Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers 2 contained, at least
implicitly, elements of a general injunction remedy for the breach
of union no-strike obligations. The Supreme Court upheld an order
enjoining a strike alleged to be in breach of contract and ruled that
any dispute over the scope of the no-strike obligation should be
resolved in arbitration.
The strike grew out of a safety dispute involving the failure of
three foremen in a coal mine to report reduced air flow caused by
the collapse of a ventilation structure. At the union's insistence, the
foremen were suspended from work. The state department of environmental resources, after investigating the incident, determined
that the company should be allowed to return the foremen to work,
even though criminal charges were pending against them. When the
company reinstated two of the foremen (the third had retired in the
2
interim), the miners walked off the job. 1
The union rejected the company's offer to arbitrate the dispute
over the continued use of the two foremen. Although the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties did not contain a nostrike clause, the grievance-arbitration provisions were unusually
broad, subjecting to arbitration not only differences over the mean25 Id., quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
- 414 U.S. 368 (1974). See generally Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee
Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REv. 647 (1975).
2 The two who had been reinstated ultimately pleaded nolo contendere to charges of
falsification of records and were fined $200 each. 414 U.S. at 72.
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ing of the agreement but also disagreements about matters "not
specifically mentioned" in the contract and "any local trouble of
any kind. . . at the mine." 8 Only disputes2 that could be described
as "national in character" were exempted. 1
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed
the district court's issuance of an injunction that restrained the
strike, required arbitration of the dispute over the alleged safety
hazard involved in the continued use of the foremen, and ordered
the suspension of the foremen pending the arbitrator's decision. The
Court's analysis of the propriety of breach-of-contract strike injunctions, however, shifted from that employed in Boys Markets. The
opinion in Boys Markets did not place particular weight on the
existence of the express no-strike clause governing the parties: indeed, the Court's strong emphasis on the policy favoring labor arbitration could be read to mean that the injunction restraining the
strike was in furtherance of the arbitration provisions of the parties'
agreement, rather than in the nature of enforcement of the no-strike
3
clause. 1
Justice Powell's opinion for the majority in Gateway Coal reiterated the Court's high regard for the policy favoring labor arbitration, even in the context of disputes over safety conditions; 3' but the
main thrust of the opinion dealt with the nature of the no-strike
obligation, viewed as critical to the district court's authority to
award injunctive relief. The Mine Workers had forcefully contended
that because the bargaining agreement did not contain an express
no-strike clause and, in fact, provided that express no-strike clauses
in prior agreements were "rescinded, cancelled, abrogated and
made null and void, ' 32 the district court was deprived of any authorId. at 374 n.6.
Id. at 375 n.7.
Even if management is not encouraged by the unavailability of the injunction
remedy to resist arbitration agreements, the fact remains that the effectiveness of such
agreements would be greatly reduced if injunctive relief were withheld. Indeed, the very
purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without resort to strikes, lockouts, or other self-help measures. This basic purpose is obviously largely undercut if there is no immediate, effective
remedy for those very tactics that arbitration is designed to obviate.
398 U.S. at 249.
31 The court of appeals had embraced the proposition that national labor policy affirmatively disfavors arbitration of safety disputes, and it questioned whether labor arbitrators
might be too grudging in appreciating the interest of workers in safety. 466 F.2d at 1157, 115960. Justice Powell's opinion regarded the trial court's order requiring the suspension of the
two foremen pending arbitration as effectively eliminating any safety issue in the case. 414
U.S. at 387-88.
1,
32 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968, Miscellaneous Section,
quoted in 414 U.S. at 384 n.15.
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ity to enjoin a strike, whether in derogation of an agreement to
arbitrate or not. Justice Powell responded to this contention by
implying an obligation not to strike from the contractual commitment to submit disputes to arbitration, 3 invoking the old chestnut
that "a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo
for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to
the process of arbitration."3 4
The centrality of the no-strike obligation, even if implied, to the
Court's view of the foundation of Boys Markets injunctions is demonstrated by Justice Powell's conclusion that the authority to issue
an injunction "depends on whether the union was under a contractual duty not to strike."3 Justice Powell observed that in most cases
the agreement to arbitrate and the obligation not to strike would be
coterminous, but he suggested that they are "analytically distinct"
issues.3 6 Thus, the parties could agree specifically to negate a nostrike obligation, leaving only an agreement to arbitrate-which
would not be sufficient to authorize a Boys Markets injunction
3
against a breach-of-contract strike. 1
The importance of the scope of the no-strike obligation to a
court's authority to issue injunctive relief is further demonstrated
by Justice Powell's analysis of section 502 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 38 which permits refusal to work in the face of abnormally dangerous working conditions. Although the majority suggested that the section 502 privilege was inapplicable on the facts
of Gateway Coal since the allegation of abnormally dangerous conditions was supported by no more than the subjective judgment of
the employees, Justice Powell stated in dictum that the proper invocation of section 502 by the presentation of objective evidence would
have created an exception to an express or implied no-strike obligation and that this exception would have deprived the trial court of
39
the authority to issue a Boys Markets injunction.
Furthermore, the Court interpreted the contract in Gateway
31The Court relied on Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), which
had established that in a § 301 damage action a no-strike obligation could be implied from
an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. For criticism of this decision, and for its
implications for the principle of freedom of contract in development of § 301 law, see H.
WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRocEss 112-19 (1968).

1 414 U.S. at 382, quoting Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248
(1970), citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
3414 U.S. at 380.
3, Id. at 382.

7 Id.
29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
1, 414 U.S. at 385.
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Coal to provide that any dispute over the scope of the no-strike
obligation was to be resolved under the broad arbitration provisions
in the governing bargaining agreement. The court of appeals, reversing the district court, had found that a contractual provision permitting a local mine safety committee to remove mine workers from
an unsafe area had been substantially invoked-creating an express
exception to the no-strike obligation. The Supreme Court found this
interpretation doubtful, and ruled that whether these procedures
had been properly invoked by the Mine Workers was "a substantial
question of contractual interpretation"4 0 that should have been resolved under the agreement's dispute settlement provisions.,
In sum, Gateway Coal expanded the "limited" category of cases
in which labor injunctions will be deemed appropriate. First, even
in the absence of an express no-strike clause, the presence of final
and binding grievance-arbitration procedures in the bargaining
agreement may give rise to an implied no-strike obligation authorizing a court to enjoin a strike. Second, disputes arising over the scope
or application of the express or implied no-strike obligation are to
be resolved under the grievance-arbitration procedures which the
parties will be directed to utilize as part of the comprehensive relief
42
ordered.

Id. at 384.
41In what may be an alternative holding, the Court appeared to affirm the district court's
finding that the procedures had not been properly invoked. Id. at 383. Even after Gateway
the Third Circuit remains of the view that the trial court has the authority to determine
whether the UMW contractual provision permitting a local mine safety committee to remove
workers from an unsafe area has been properly invoked. In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 519 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1975), the panel majority determined that a proper invocation
of the provision by the mine safety committee created an exception to the implied no-strike
obligation in the UMW agreement, depriving the trial court of authority to issue an injunction
requiring employees to work in those areas designated as imminent dangers by the committee.
Judge Rosenn dissented in part on the ground that further factual development in the trial
court was necessary because the record did not demonstrate conclusively that the mine safety
committee had properly invoked the no-strike exception. Id. at 1159-60 (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting).
42 Justice Douglas filed the lone dissent. 414 U.S. at 388-94. He agreed with the majority
that in injunction suits an obligation not to strike could be implied from an agreement to
arbitrate. Id. at 391. In his view, however, the parties' agreement had specifically reserved to
the union the unrestricted right to close the mine because of safety hazards, id. at 389, and §
502 negated any presumption of arbitrability with respect to safety disputes. Id. at 391-92.
He concluded that even if the parties' agreement had specifically, or by operation of the
arbitrability presumption, required submission of safety disputes to arbitration, the comprehensive regulatory scheme afforded by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970), preempted all agreements to arbitrate mine safety disputes and
excluded arbitration from any role in the regulation of mine safety. 414 U.S. at 394. With
this position, compare Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), issued shortly after Gateway, where the Court ruled that prior
10
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BUFFALO FORGE: RETREAT FROM THE EXPANSIONIST REMEDY

In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,4 3 the Supreme
Court restricted Gateway Coal's authorization of a strike injunction
pending arbitral resolution of the scope of the no-strike obligation.
Reverting to the principal rationale of the Boys Markets accommodation of section 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act-furtherance of
arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes-the Court determined that more than a dispute about the application of a no-strike
obligation to a particular work stoppage is required to justify injunctive relief. In addition, the strike must have been precipitated by a
dispute between the parties that is itself arbitrable.
Two locals of the United Steelworkers Union represented and
negotiated collective bargaining agreements on behalf of the production and maintenance employees (PM employees) of the Buffalo
Forge Company.4 The bargaining agreement of the PM employees
contained a no-strike clause prohibiting "strikes, work stoppages or
interruption or impeding of work,"45 and established procedures for
the adjustment of grievances, which were defined to include
"differences . . . between the [employer] and any employee . . .

as to the meaning and application" of the agreement's provisions
and "any trouble of any kind.

. .

in the plant.""8 With respect to

grievances involving the "meaning and application" of the agreearbitration of an employment discrimination claim does not preclude, and may be denied any
and all weight in, a subsequent action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
428 U.S. 397 (1976).
" The statement of facts in the text is derived from Justice White's opinion for the Court,
supplemented by the opinion of the district court, 386 F. Supp. 405, 407-09 (W.D.N.Y. 1974),
and the opinion of the court of appeals, 517 F.2d 1207, 1209 (2d Cir. 1975).
0 Section 14.b. of each collective bargaining agreement provided:
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of work. No
Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, instigate, aid or condone any
such activities. No employee shall participate in any such activity. The Union recognizes
its possible liabilities for violation of this provision and will use its influence to see that
work stoppages are prevented. Unsuccessful efforts by Union officers or Union representatives to prevent and terminate conduct prohibited by this paragraph, will not be construed as "aid" or "condonation" of such conduct and shall not result in any disciplinary
actions against the Officers, committeemen or stewards involved.
428 U.S. 399 n.1 (1976).
11 Section 26 of the agreements provided:
Should differences arise between the [employer] and any employee covered by this
Agreement as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or
should any trouble of any kind arise in the plant, there shall be no suspension of work
on account of such differences, but an earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences immediately [in the following manner] ....
428 U.S. at 400.
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after five successive
ment's provisions, the procedures culminated,
47
stages, in final and binding arbitration.
Two other Steelworkers locals represented the company's office, clerical and technical employees (OCT employees). Having
failed to negotiate a first collective bargaining agreement with the
company covering the OCT employees, the Steelworkers and the
OCT employee locals struck and established picket lines at the
company's three Buffalo facilities. The company attempted to forestall a PM employee sympathy work stoppage by offering to arbitrate any dispute between the PM employees and the company, but
the offer was rejected. When the PM employees refused to cross the
OCT picket lines, stopping work at all three plants, the company
filed a section 301 suit seeking an injunction and damages from the
locals representing the PM employees.
The company argued that the refusal to cross the picket lines
created an arbitrable dispute as to whether the no-strike clause in
the agreement had been breached, and that Boys Markets therefore
authorized the court to halt the work stoppage pending submission
of the dispute to the grievance-arbitration procedure. The trial
court rejected this contention, reasoning that the exception to the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act created by
Boys Markets was a "narrow" one, arising, in the words of Boys
Markets itself, "[w]hen a strike . . . sought to be enjoined . . . is
over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate . . ,,." Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit in Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,51 the court found that because
47 See note 52 infra.
"8 Before the trial court, the company also contended that the work stoppage was caused
by a dispute with the PM employee locals regarding the assignment of truck driving duties
to PM employees during the OCT employees' strike. The district judge found that the work
stoppage was caused solely by the instructions of the Steelworkers not to cross OCT picket
lines, 386 F. Supp. at 408-09, and the company did not seek to disturb this finding on appeal.
517 F.2d at 1211 n.7.
11 386 F. Supp. at 409, quoting Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at
254, quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'g 337 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. La. 1972). In Amstar,
members of the International Longshoremen's Association on strike against the company
established a picket line at the company's Chalmette, Louisiana refinery. Company production and maintenance employees at that location were represented by the Meat Cutters, and
had negotiated a collective agreement prohibiting strikes and providing a grievancearbitration procedure for the resolution of "differences and complaints." 337 F. Supp. at 813.
The trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate their "dispute" over the application of the nostrike prohibition to picket line respect, and issued an injunction restraining refusals to cross
the line. The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that one of the core prerequisites of the Boys
Markets formula for obtaining injunctive relief was that "the strike must be 'over' an arbitra-
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the only dispute between the company and the PM employees was
the propriety of the work stoppage itself, there was no strike 'over-'
an arbitrable issue. The dispute that had caused the strike, the
court reasoned, was between the company and the OCT employees,
a matter clearly not cognizable under the bargaining agreement of
the PM employees. The court of appeals affirmed.5 1
Buffalo Forge actually presented a stronger case for denying
injunctive relief than Amstar. Although the grievance-arbitration
procedure in Buffalo Forge permitted both the Company and the
union to appeal from the fifth stage of the grievance procedure to
arbitration, 2 only the employees were permitted to file
"grievances," and only the employees and the union were permitted
to appeal grievances to higher stages within the grievance procedure. 53 Such one-sided "employee-oriented" grievance-arbitration
procedures are usually negotiated at the insistence of employers, to
insure that their breach of contract claims will not be subject to
binding contract arbitration but will be cognizable only in court
actions." Boys Markets relief had been denied by some courts in

ble grievance" and "both parties must be contractually bound to arbitrate the underlying
grievance which caused the strike." 468 F.2d at 1373 (emphasis added). The court of appeals
concluded that the refusal to cross the ILA picket line was itself the cause of the dispute
between the parties and could not, therefore, be the basis of injunctive relief. The Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed its Amstar reasoning in United States Steel Corp. v. UMW,519 F.2d 1236
(5th Cir. 1975). For other cases following Amstar's interpretation of Boys Markets, see Plain
Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976); Carnation Co. v. Teamsters Local 949, 86 L.R.R.M.
3012 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 373
F. Supp. 19 (D.N.J. 1974). For pre-Amstar district court rulings embracing the same interpretation, see Ourisman Chevrolet Co. v. Automotive Lodge 1486, 77 L.R.R.M. 2084 (D.D.C.
1971); Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, 314 F. Supp. 885 (D.N.H. 1970);
General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331 F. Supp. 478 (D.Md. 1971).
51 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975).
52 Section 32 provided:
Sixth. In the event the grievance involves a question as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, and has not been previously satisfactorily
adjusted, it may be submitted to arbitration upon written notice of the Union or the
Company . . . .The arbitrator shall not have the power to add to, to disregard, or
modify any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The decision of the arbitrator
shall be binding upon the parties.
Appendix to Briefs of the Parties, at 17, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d
1207 (2d Cir. 1975).
"
Section 27 of the bargaining agreement provided that grievances, as defined in section
26, note 46 supra, could be settled "[f]irst . . . . [b]etween the aggrieved employee and
the foreman of the department involved. . . ."Subsequent sections of the contract permitted
appeals to higher stages of the procedure by an aggrieved employee or a member of the union's
grievance committee. Step 5 of the procedure was the final prearbitration stage. Id.
$1In Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), the Supreme Court ruled that
where an employer was denied access to a grievance-arbitration procedure because the procedure was "employee oriented," it was error for the trial court to issue a stay of the employer's
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cases involving "employee-oriented" grievance procedures on the
ground that the contractual exclusion of employer claims from the
grievance procedure precludes a court from ordering arbitration in
conjunction with a strike injunction.5 This basis for denying injunctive relief did not exist in Amstar, where the employer was permitted by the contract to initiate the grievance procedure." Neither the
trial judge nor the court of appeals in Buffalo Forge, however, relied
on this distinction in denying injunctive relief5

§ 301 damage action alleging union breach of contract pending submission of the employer's
damage claim to an arbitrator. Accord, Faultless Div. v. Local 2040, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,
513 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1975); Ed Friedrich v. Local 780, IUE, 515 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975);
Affiliated Food Distribs., Inc. v. Local 229, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 483 F.2d 418 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974); but see Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American
Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962) (stay of damage action pending arbitration affirmed
because employer had right to initiate contract's grievance procedure as well as appeal to
arbitration regarding its claim for damages arising out of union breach of no-strike clause).
See also Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters District Council, 535 F.2d 598 (10th Cir.
1976); Meat Cutters Local 195 v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1975);
Controlled Sanitation Corp. v. District 128, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 524 F.2d 1324 (3d Cir.
1975); Blake Constr. Co. v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 511 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
" See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 447 F.2d 945, 946 n.1 (7th Cir.
1971); Hormel & Co. v. Local P-31, Meat Cutters, 349 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Iowa 1972);
Stroehmann Co. v. Local 427, Confectionery Workers, 315 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Pa. 1970). But
see Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
See Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 810, 813-14 (E.D. La.
1972).
" The Amstar rationale for denying Boys Marketsrelief against picket line respect arguably in violation of a no-strike obligation was rejected in a variety of factual contexts by the
Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits, with the Seventh Circuit initially rejecting but subsequently expressing qualified approval. See Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425,
519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 428 U.S. 906 (1976); Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Operating Eng'rs Local 49, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975); NAPA Pittsburgh,
Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1049 (1974), noted in 88 Harv. L. Rev. 463 (1974); Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir.
1973).
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th
Cir. 1974), spawned a line of cases which represented the broadest extension of Boys Markets
injunctive relief. Construing the provisions of the Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement which
did not contain a no-strike clause, these decisions ruled that unusually broad grievancearbitration provisions, similar to those in Gateway Coal, subjecting to arbitration "disputes
about matters not specifically mentioned in this agreement" and "any local trouble of any
kind aris[ing] at the mine," id. at 297 n.5, permitted the implication of a no-strike obligation. This implied obligation formed the basis for an injunction prohibiting picket line respect
pending an arbitral determination of the work stoppage's permissibility under the bargaining
agreement. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW Local 998, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 877 (1975); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 877 (1975). In Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing & Lifting Machine Ass'n, 519 F.2d
89 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976), however, the Seventh Circuit confined
Inland Steel to its precise facts. Citing Amstar with apparent approval, the court vacated an
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Justice White's opinion for the Supreme Court majority upholding the denial of injunctive relief relied in part on a determination that the union's work stoppage had not "deprived the employer
of his bargain.""8 No analysis of the "employer's bargain" in terms
of the right of access to the grievance-arbitration mechanism was
undertaken, however. Although the employer's only access to the
grievance-arbitration mechanism was by appeal to arbitration after
exhaustion of the "employee-oriented" grievance procedure, Justice
White declared that "[t]he employer ... was entitled to invoke the
arbitral process to determine the legality of the sympathy strike and
to obtain a court order requiring the Union to arbitrate if the Union
refused to do so."s But under the parties' contract, this statement
would be accurate only if an "aggrieved" employee or the union had
initiated the grievance procedure and had appealed a claim of contract breach to the final step of the grievance process, or if the union
had waived the prearbitration grievance procedure.
Justice White's determination that the union was required to
arbitrate the employer's breach-of-contract claim did not, however,
entitle the employer to injunctive relief pending arbitration. Agreeing with the analysis in Amstar, the Court majority concluded that
the "narrow" holding in Boys Markets authorized prearbitration
injunctive relief against a breach of contract strike only when the
strike was "over," or precipitated by, an otherwise arbitrable dispute between the parties."0 The picket line respect and sympathy
strike at issue "had neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or
evading an obligation to arbitrate,""1 and were thus outside the area
of concern of Boys Markets. Nevertheless, the Court ordered the
union to arbitrate the dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause,
and ruled that if the arbitrator determined that the sympathy strike
was in breach of contract, and the union continued its work stopinjunction barring a work stoppage caused by picket line respect, and concluded that respect

for another union's picket line did not raise an arbitrable issue under the contract and was
not, in any event, prohibited by the relevant agreement's express no-strike clause.
Post-Boys Markets decisions under the Railway Labor Act also permitted injunctive
relief against refusals to cross picket lines. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Machinists
Lodge 143, 442 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1970) (contract contained express no-strike clause); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 442 F.2d 246 and 251 (8th Cir. 1970 and 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 371 (1971) (contract did not contain express no-strike clause); Puerto
Rico Int'l Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 86 L.R.R.M. 3189 (D.P.R. 1974); Ozark Air Lines,

Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
428 U.S. at 408 (1976).

61Id. at 405. Later the majority stated, "Concededly, that issue was arbitrable." Id. at
410.
"

Id. at 403.
Id. at 408.
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page, a court could enforce the arbitrator's award by enjoining the
strike. Such an injunction would be an enforcement of the arbitrator's award, making it consonant with the policy favoring labor
2
arbitration.1
Justice White suggested that authorizing prearbitration injunctive relief where the only disputed issue is the permissibility of the
work stoppage itself would impair the federal policy favoring labor
arbitration of contract disputes. The courts in such cases would
usurp arbitration by delving into the merits of breach of contract
strike claims in preliminary injunction hearings. 3 Since the parties
do not, in conventional grievance-arbitration clauses, contract for a
"judicial preview of the facts and the law," 4 the Court concluded
that to permit judicial intervention would "eviscerate" the use of
contractual procedures. 5 Related to this concern, and perhaps more
important to the Court's determination to deny injunctive relief,
was its fear that expanding Boys Markets injunctions to encompass
specific enforcement of all no-strike obligations would flood the already heavily burdened federal courts with "massive" preliminary
injunction litigation. 6
Finally, Justice White's opinion argued that Congress' refusal
to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act when it enacted section 301
demonstrated that there was no general federal anti-strike policy
embodied in section 301.7 Thus, it would be inappropriate to interpret section 301 to allow general injunctive enforcement of no-strike
obligations, without regard to protecting the arbitration process. In
this connection the Court apparently rejected any further expansion
of Boys Markets relief beyond the facts in Gateway Coal. Although
the Court in Gateway Coal had specifically enforced an implied nostrike obligation and had ruled that the issue concerning the scope
of the no-strike obligation should have been submitted to arbitration, such relief was appropriate, according to Justice White, only
because the strike itself had been precipitated by a dispute arbitra2 Id. at 405, citing United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); see New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local
1418, 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
3 428 U.S. at 410, 410-12.
64 Id.
at 412.

"Id.
,Id. at 411 n.12. The Court noted that more than 21,000,000 workers were covered by
150,000 collective bargaining agreements, but it did not indicate how or why that fact would
result in "massive" preliminary injunction litigation.
11Id. at 409. Justice White cited the dissenting opinion in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting), which was subsequently embraced in Boys
Markets.
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ble under the contract. In so limiting Gateway Coal, Justice White's
opinion declared, in dictum, that in the absence of an express nostrike clause, an obligation not to engage in sympathy strikes or
respect for the picket lines of other unions would not be implied
from the mere existence of mandatory grievance-arbitration provisions. 8
Justice Steven's dissenting opinion contended that the majority's literal application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act conflicted with
the policy of that statute, the policy of section 301, the prior opinions of the Court accomodating the two statutory provisions, and
the favored policy of promoting labor arbitration." The dissenters,
however, refused to embrace the full logical conclusion their premises required. Injunctions enforcing no-strike clauses would be ordered, in their analysis, only when the union's strike "clearly" violated a contractual no-strike clause.7
A review of the policy framework of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
convinced the dissenters that the purpose of the Act was to promote
collective bargaining by preventing the often hostile federal courts
from interfering with the right to organize and choose bargaining
representatives." Because "experience during the decades since the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed has dissipated any legitimate
concern about the impartiality of federal judges in disputes between
labor and management, 7 2 the dissenters viewed injunctions enforcing collective bargaining agreements as not impinging on the central
concerns of the Act. The legislative history of section 301 reinforced
this conclusion because Congress, by stating in the Conference Report that the enforcement of bargaining agreements should be left
to "the usual processes of law, 7 3 indicated its intention to allow
injunctions in enforcement of bargaining agreements.
Justice Stevens advanced two arguments attacking the majority's premise that an injunction against picket line respect or a
sympathy strike would not serve the policy favoring labor arbitra" Id. at 408. The Court, therefore, directly disapproved the implication of such an obligation in Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974), and the apparent
acquiescence in this line of reasoning by the courts of appeals in Buffalo Forge and Amstar.
Id. at 408-09 n.10. Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion agreed with the majority's dictum.
Id. at 425 n.17.
" 428 U.S. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell
joined the dissenting opinion.
70 Id. at 426.
7'Id. at 415-16 nn.6 & 7.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 420, 422, quoting Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452
(1957) (Douglas, J.), quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[44:321

tion. First, while conceding that respect for a picket line or a sympathy strike does not directly frustrate the arbitration process, the
dissenters contended that the lack of a specific performance remedy
"frustrate[s] the more basic policy of motivating employers to
agree to binding arbitration"7 4 by weakening the bargained-for assurance of uninterrupted production during the term of the agreement. Second, and more important, the dissent could find no justification for the majority's authorizing injunctions to enforce an arbitrator's decision banning sympathy work stoppages while refusing
such relief prior to the arbitrator's award.75 In neither situation is
the strike technically "over" an arbitrable issue, 78 and the dissent
noted that the same reasons that justify an injunction requiring the
parties to obey an arbitrator's determination that a strike is in violation of a no-strike clause also "justify an injunction against a strike
17
that would impair his ability to reach a decision.
Concern that a court issuing a breach-of-contract strike injunction would usurp the role of the labor arbitrator in construing the
contract, however, prompted the dissenters to withdraw from endorsing an unrestricted injunction remedy. To ensure proper respect
for the greater expertise of labor arbitrators relative to federal
judges, and the appropriate relationship between courts and arbitrators, Justice Stevens would permit equitable intervention only
when there was "convincing evidence that the strike is clearly
within the no-strike clause, ' 78 and, apparently, when issues regarding the scope of the no-strike clause are "clearly arbitrable" under
79
the contract.
As the author of the student note espousing the "clearly within
the no-strike clause" standard adopted by the dissent commented,
injunctions under this standard "will be issued rarely, although in
many cases the strike will eventually be found illegal." 8 In practice,
7

'Id. at 424.
11Id. at 424-26.
7 Id. at 413 n.2.
Id. at 425.
7' Id. at 431.
7' It is not necessary to hold that an injunction may issue if the scope of the nostrike clause is not a clearly arbitrable issue. If the agreement contains no arbitration
clause whatsoever, enforcement of the no-strike clause would not promote arbitration
by encouraging employers to agree to an arbitration clause in exchange for a no-strike
clause. Furthermore, even if the agreement contains an arbitration clause, but the clause
does not clearly extend to the question whether a strike violates the agreement, the
parties' commitment to enforcement of the no-strike clause through enforcement of the
arbitrator's final decision also remains unclear.
Id. at 426-27 n.20.
10Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets Injunctions to Refusals to Cross a Picket
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therefore, the majority and dissenting opinions would not produce
substantially different results. If the dissenter's standard prevailed,
most trial judges, advised by Justice Stevens that they are not as
expert as labor arbitrators in breach of labor contract matters,
would probably be quite reluctant to find "convincing evidence" of
a "clear" contract violation. Astute union counsel would have little
difficulty pointing to ambiguities in contractual language notorious
for its lack of precision."' Nor would the frequency of intervention
increase over time through the development of a body of precedent.
Even if a particular no-strike clause were judicially determined to
"clearly" bar a sympathy strike or picket line respect, this finding
would probably have little application outside the particular adjudication. Sympathy strikes and picket line respect rarely take the
same form or follow the same pattern, and a clause "clearly" prohibiting a specific form of activity may well be ambiguous when applied
to another fact pattern or to the same fact pattern in a different
collective bargaining relationship. Moreover, questions about the
scope of a "clear" clause may be "clearly arbitrable" in one collective bargaining relationship but not in another, and under Justice
Stevens's standard ambiguity on the arbitrability of no-strike issues
is also a ground for refusing injunctive relief. Therefore, few circumstances in which both the no-strike and arbitrability issues are
"clear" will arise.
A common theme unites the majority and dissenting opinions
in Buffalo Forge in their withdrawal from the expanded remedy
established in Gateway Coal: when the sole dispute between labor
and management concerns the permissibility of a work stoppage
under a contract, the distrust of federal judges embodied in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act requires that federal courts be precluded
from prearbitration equitable intervention entirely (majority) or in
most, if not all, circumstances (minority). An assessment of this
Line, 76 COLUM. L. Rav. 113, 138 (1976). The author of this note cited Stokely-Van Camp,
Inc. v. Thacker, 394 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Wash. 1975), as authority for the proposal and
justified this thesis by contending that the employer had an adequate remedy, namely,
assuring that the contract clearly indicates what conduct is prohibited. "Thus, the employer
simply bears the burden of sloppy draftsmanship." 76 COLUM. L. REv. at 140.
81 [Tihere is never, of course, enough time to do an impeccable job of draftsmanship after substantive agreement is reached-apart from the hazard that such an effort
might uncover troublesome disagreement. Though the subject matter is complex and the
provisions intricate, the language must nevertheless be directed to laymen whose occupation is not interpretation ....
Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 999, 1004 (1955).
An appreciation of the complexity, intricacy and variety of no-strike clauses may be gained
by referring to BNA, CoLLcnv BARGAINING NEGOTATIONS AND CoNTRACTs 77:1-77:2 (1975).
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distrust in light of the policy considerations behind the NorrisLaGuardia Act and section 301 follows.
IV.
SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF NO-STRIKE OBLIGATIONS AND THE
ACCOMMODATION OF THE NORRIS LAGUARDIA ACT WITH SECTION 301

The Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Forge is unsatisfactory at several levels. In justifying a retreat from further expansion
of Boys Markets relief, the majority ignored the significant labor
policies furthered by permitting general injunctive relief to enforce
union no-strike obligations. Moreover, the concern of both the majority and the dissent about the effect of prearbitration injunctions
on the proper relationship between federal courts and arbitrators
was largely unfounded. Finally, in failing to recognize the employeeoriented nature of the bargaining agreement at issue, the Court may
have undermined, probably unintentionally, the continued viability
of a previously unquestioned line of cases dealing with damage actions under section 301.
A. Labor Law Policy and Injunctions Enforcing No-Strike
Obligations
Congress enacted section 301 out of concern over the nonenforceability of collective bargaining settlements. At common law
unions often were not suable or subject to process as legal entities,
and relief against breach of contract might not be obtained even if
a union were properly before a court. The primary purpose of section 301 was to remedy the absence of a labor contract enforcement
mechanism by ensuring that labor contracts were binding and enforceable on the parties.82
Binding and enforceable bargaining agreements serve the interests of both labor and management in day-to-day industrial relations. Most, if not all, negotiations between the parties have the
collective agreement as their reference point. An enforceable agreement protects established rights and benefits, settled procedures for
dealing with job disputes, and uninterrupted production. Allowing
one party to breach the agreement with impunity by denying equitable relief to the other creates a strong disincentive to participate
in meaningful collective bargaining.13 The institution of collective

"

S. REP. No. 105, 80h Cong., Ist Sess. 15-18 (1947); NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 421-24 (1948).
. But see Local 721, United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers v. Needham Packing
Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964) (holding that a union breach of a no-strike clause does not excuse
an employer from adhering to the obligation to arbitrate under a collective agreement).
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bargaining, so critical to the core purposes of national labor policy
and the cause of industrial peace, 84 is disserved by strikes in breach
of contract.
The express words of the Norris-LaGuardia Act-forbidding
injunctions of all strikes unless accompanied by fraud or violence-and a considerable body of commentary85 support the Supreme Court's refusal to relax the anti-injunction strictures in all
breach-of-contract strikes. Moreover, many who recognized the inequity inherent in Sinclair might now contend, as they did then,
that accommodation of the anti-injunction provisions with section
301 is for Congress rather than the judiciary. Yet the NorrisLaGuardia Act is only one component of the regulatory design. It
was responsive to the conditions of the era preceding its enactment
and was adopted to deprive the federal courts of the authority to
issue injunctions assisting employers in their attempts to crush
union organizational drives.17 Refusing to enforce collective bargaining agreements was not one of the corrective actions envisioned by
Congress. Indeed, as the dissenters in Buffalo Forgerecognized, one
of the fundamental goals of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was full freedom to engage in the process of collective bargaining.8 8
Outside the context of section 301, the Supreme Court has
found occasion to harmonize the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act with other statutory objectives. The Court has determined that
the anti-injunction provisions must give way to the statutory
dispute-resolution procedures of the Railway Labor Act, and that
strike injunctions may issue when a union has breached its Railway
Labor Act obligation to make and maintain agreements by the
collective bargaining process. 9 The Court has also required that the
anti-injunction provisions be applied in a fashion not inconsistent
with the fundamental concerns of the antitrust laws. The fact that
I See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 370, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970)).
" E.g., Bartosic, supra note 10, at 996-1001; Dunau, supra note 10, at 463; Valadeck,
supra note 10, at 100; Comment, LaborInjunctions and Judge-Made LaborLaw, 70 YALE L.J.
70, 99 (1960).
" See, e.g., Wellington & Albert, supra note 10, at 1566; SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS
LAw, ABA, supra note 10, at 266.
a See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 5-46 (1930);E. WrrrE, THE
GovERNm C r IN LABOR DIsPurEs 61-82 (1932).
U See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970), quoted in 428 U.S. at 415-16
n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
N UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S.
797 (1945). See also Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965). For an analysis of these cases as well as the "fundamental concerns" of antitrust policy
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the policies embodied in the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
have been accommodated with the Railway Labor Act and basic
antitrust policy suggests that courts should not ignore the policies
underlying section 301 in interpreting the scope of the antiinjunction provisions.
Injunctions enforcing union no-strike obligations comport with
the general standards for equitable intervention. The harm caused
to the employer by denying injunctive relief pending an expedited
arbitral determination of the no-strike issue outweighs the harm to
a union by granting relief for that time period. Because of the inadequacy of union treasuries and the disruptive influence of a damage
action on labor relations after a strike is settled, Boys Markets itself
recognized the deficiency of the employer's damage remedy for most
strikes in breach of contract." Moreover, the traditional argument
that temporary or preliminary strike injunctions may destroy the
momentum of the industrial action and impose irreparable harm on
the union carries less force in the context of sympathy strikes and
respect for picket lines. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in
Buffalo Forge, sympathy work stoppages do not directly benefit the
92
participants and may well be contrary to their own best interests.
Thus, if the right to engage in a sympathy strike is upheld by an
arbitrator, it is unlikely that the time lost during the period of
arbitration will substantially dampen the enthusiasm for the strike;
in fact, a favorable award could increase willingness to strike by
removing any shadow of illegality from the work stoppage. In these
circumstances, requiring a union to forgo a strike or work stoppage,
at least until an expedited arbitration determines the rights of the
parties, is a relatively small price to pay for enforcing the bargaining
agreement until its own dispute-resolving procedures have been
given an opportunity to function.
tRemedies other than injunctions are likely to be inadequate in
the context of sympathy strikes or picket line respect. If the primary
strike or picketing is for the purpose of improving working conditions in an established bargaining relationship, the sympathy work
stoppage or picket line respect has no "recognitional or organizational" objective and is therefore not prohibited by section 8(b)(7)
of the Labor Management Relations Act.93 Furthermore, section
in connection with labor matters, see Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargainingand the
Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CH. L. Rav. 659 (1965).
"1398 U.S. at 248.
32 428 U.S. at 429.
13 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970).
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8(b)(4)(B),94 the so-called "secondary boycott" provision, may not
be available if the sympathy strike or picket line respect does not
serve union objectives "elsewhere" 9 -because other employees of
the same employer are involved-or if the pressure is not for the
purpose of requiring the picketed employer to cease doing business
with another "person."" Finally, insofar as sympathy work stoppages and respect for picket lines may be characterized as arguably
subject to section 7 or 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, traditional state tort remedies against nonviolent activity are
preempted."
Denying federal courts the authority to issue prearbitration injunctions enforcing no-strike obligations also runs squarely into the
enigma Boys Markets was in part designed to eliminate: divergent
remedies in state and federal courts, and the effective foreclosure of
state equitable remedies by the availability of removal to federal
court.9 8 Since some states allow specific performance of no-strike
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970).
The touchstone for determining whether § 8(b)(4)(B) has been violated is whether the
pressure is aimed at the relations between the primary employer and his employees or is
"tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere." National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644 (1967); see Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 664 (1967).
19Where roving pickets are sent to corporate divisions or subsidiaries other than the one
with which the union has a dispute, or where picketing by employees at their own place of
employment is involved, the picketing does not require "persons" to cease doing business.
Despite corporate divisional or subsidiary structure only one "person" exists for the purposes
of § 8(b)(4)(B). But see Packinghouse Employees Local 616, 203 N.L.R.B. 645 (1973); Local
235, Int'l Union of Lithographers, 187 N.L.R.B. 490 (1971); Local 810, Steel Fabricators &
Warehousers, 189 N.L.R.B. 612 (1971), enforcement denied, 460 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1041 (1972); General Drivers Local 563, 186 N.L.R.B. 219 (1970); Television & Radio
Artists Washington-Baltimore Local, 185 N.L.R.B. 593 (1970), enforced, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69, 185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), enforced, 443
F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971); Teamsters Local 639, 158 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1966); Miami Newspaper
Printing Pressmen Local 46, 138 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
" Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 97 S. Ct. 1056 (1977); International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Association of Street Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959). Applying Garmon, the Supreme Court has held preempted a state cause of action
premised on the theory that the establishment of a picket line constitutes inducement of
breach of contract enjoinable under state tort law. Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962); Dixie
Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 243 F. Supp. 489
(E.D. La. 1965); Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. National Maritime Union, 206 F. Supp. 741 (E.D.
Pa. 1962). See also Consolidation Coal Co. v. UMW, 537 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976).
IsAvco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), permitted
state court actions for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements to be removed to
federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970), even though injunctive relief, available
in the state court, could not be obtained in federal court because of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and the Sinclair decision.
"
"
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obligations without regard to an arbitrator's award, 9 the Buffalo
Forge majority's restriction of the availability of Boys Markets relief
creates, to a degree, the same incentives for forum shopping that
emerged under Sinclair."'o
The Supreme Court failed to recognize the substantial policies
supporting specific performance of no-strike obligations. Nor did
the Court articulate persuasive reasons for denying such relief. In
fact, had the Court given adequate consideration to the flexibility
of equitable intervention, the fears of both the majority and the
dissent about the consequences of injunctive relief pending arbitration would have been seen as unfounded.
B. The Nature of a General Injunction Remedy for No-Strike
Clause Breaches
Justice White, writing for the Buffalo Forge majority, read Boys
Markets as authorizing injunctive relief only where it would further
the policy developed under section 301 favoring arbitration of labor
disputes. But his narrow inquiry into whether the work stoppage
was caused by an otherwise arbitrable dispute was only partially
responsive to this central concern of the Boys Markets accommodation. Justice White assumed that prearbitration injunctive relief
would encourage arbitration only if the strike had been precipitated
by an arbitral dispute. Nothing is more fundamental to a collective
bargaining agreement, however, than the scope of the union's nostrike obligation. Denying prearbitration injunctive relief when the
work stoppage itself is of questionable validity under the bargaining
agreement undermines the employer's incentive to agree to submit
disputes to arbitration in exchange for the union's promise not to
strike. 101
" See Aaron, LaborInjunctionsin the State Courts-PartOne: A Survey, 50 VA. L. Rv.
951 (1964).
100See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 413 (1976)

(Stevens, J., dissenting).
"I While unions expend great energy seeking to subject breach-of-contract claims to the
arbitration process, management is frequently loath to submit disputes over sympathy strikes
and picket line respect to arbitration. In fact, arbitration of such disputes may be regarded
by many employers as too high a price to pay for the issuance of a post-arbitration order
enjoining a strike. See generally Stewart, supra note 7, at 691-96; Schubert, Arbitration and
Damage Claims for Violation of the No-Strike Clause, 16 LAB. L.J. 751 (1965). Whether
employer apprehensions about arbitration of no-strike clause issues are justified is uncertain.
One early arbitral decision laid down the following tests for ascertaining when refusals to cross
a picket line would be deemed privileged even in the face of a no-strike obligation: (1) the
picket line was established in furtherance of a "good faith labor dispute"; (2) the picket line
was not in furtherance of a dispute with another employer with whom the picketed employer
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The concern expressed by both opinions in Buffalo Forge that
prearbitration injunctive relief would inject a trial court into the
merits of a breach-of-contract claim, rendering arbitration superfluous is valid but not insurmountable. However, Justice Stevens's
suggestion that Boys Markets injunctions should issue only upon a
"clear" violation of the no-strike clause is fraught with difficulty.
As Justice White correctly pointed out,1"' the "clear" violation standard would not reduce the degree of court intrusion into the merits.
Given the ambiguity of collective bargaining agreements, it is likely
that courts would intrude into the merits as much in determining
whether there was a "clear" violation as they would in connection
with an unrestricted injunction remedy. Moreover, when a district
court judge determines that a strike "clearly" violates a contractual
duty, the arbitrator would very likely feel bound by this determination. Thus the "clear" violation standard for Boys Markets relief
threatens the independence of arbitrators. Furthermore, insofar as
Justice Stevens also advocated a standard requiring that no-strike
clause breaches be "clearly arbitrable" before Boys Markets relief
has no interest; (3) the picket line was not in furtherance of a jurisdictional dispute among
unions; (4) the picket line was not a "demonstration" picket line having no purpose in
furthering union interests in a labor dispute with the picketed employer; and (5) observance
of the picket line was not for the purpose of pressuring the picketed employer to grant
concessions to employees refusing to cross the line, or otherwise furthering the interests of
employees respecting the picket line. Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 8 Lab. Arb. 273 (1947)
(Kerr. Arb.); but see Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 9 Lab. Arb. 5 (1947) (Miller, Arb.) (same
tests applied to reach opposite result). Some decisions do evince an unwillingness to declare
respecting a picket line a violation of a no-strike obligation. See, e.g., Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 626 (1964) (Quinlan, Arb.); Vermont Structural Steel Corp., 60 Lab.
Arb. 842 (1973) (Hogan, Arb.); cf. Associated Gen. Contractors, 63 Lab. Arb. 32 (1974)
(Gallagher, Arb.) (refusals by individual employees to cross were privileged by picket line
clauses expressly permitting respect in the circumstances presented); Sears Roebuck & Co.,
35 Lab. Arb. 757 (1960) (Miller, Arb.) (refusals to cross constitute a strike but are protected
by an express clause privileging respecting picket lines). Other arbitrators have not hesitated
to find that refusals to cross the picket lines of other unions violate express no-strike clauses.
See, e.g., Bowman Transp., Inc., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8429 (1972) (Johnston,
Arb.); Amalgamated Lace Operative, 54 Lab. Arb. 140 (1969) (Frey, Arb.); Michigan Consol.
Gas, 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8294 (1969) (McIntosh, Arb.); Gulf Coast Motor Lines,
67-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8598 (1967) (Williams, Arb.); General Am. Transp. Corp., 41
Lab. Arb. 214 (1963) (Abrahams, Arb.); Mach's New York, 40 Lab. Arb. 954 (1962) (Scheiber,
Arb.); New England Master Textile Engravers Guild, 9 Lab. Arb. 199 (1947) (Wallen, Arb.);
cf. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 965 (1972) (Ray, Arb.) (union instruction to respect
picket line violates no-strike clause, but individual refusals are privileged); Metro East Journal, 47 Lab. Arb. 610 (1966) (Kelliher, Arb.) (union not responsible for breach caused by
individual decisions to respect, hence no violation); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. 22 Lab. Arb.
761 (1954) (Maggs, Arb.) (refusals to cross violate clause permitting respect only for strikes
authorized by local or international union except where refusal is based on reasonable fear of
violence).
IN 428 U.S. at 412.
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is appropriate,10 3 his opinion is in conflict with Gateway Coal, which
applied the presumption of arbitrability established by the
Steelworkers Trilogy'"4 to Boys Markets litigation."5
Both opinions overlooked the fact that trial courts possess sufficient authority to avoid both a determination of the merits of nostrike obligations and the abuses of power associated with the labor
injunctions of the past.' The injunction need be nothing more than
an order preserving the status quo pending an arbitral determination of the merits of a claimed breach of an express or implied nostrike obligation. Preserving the status quo is one of the traditional
functions of equity, 0 7 and an order requiring expedited arbitration
103

04

See note 79 supra.
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United

Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
"1 414 U.S. at 379. See Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumptionof
Arbitrability, 85 HARv. L. REv. 636 (1972) (proposing that no presumption in favor of arbitrability be indulged in Boys Markets litigation).
I" FED. R. Civ. P. 65, which did not exist when the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed,
contains many of the same procedural protections that are found in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Sections 7 & 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Rule 65 both require that injunctions
be issued only after notice to the adverse party and that injunction orders prohibit only the
specific acts complained of. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 107, 109 (1970) with FED. R. Civ. P.
65(a)(1), (d). Both permit the issuance of temporary restraining orders without notice upon
a showing of irreparable injury and require the posting of a bond as a condition of issuance.

Compare 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970) with FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b), (d).
The lower federal courts have, consistent with Boys Markets, accommodated the protections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act with Rule 65 and the policies of § 301 in establishing a
uniform set of procedures for labor injunctions. The appellate courts have agreed that § 7 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act remains applicable to the extent it is consistent with the policies
of § 301. Thus, the requirement of a hearing, including the receipt of live testimony, in open
court prior to the issuance of an injunction applies to Boys Markets injunctions unless such
a hearing would be useless. See Transit Union Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d
1073 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 97 S. Ct. 43 (1976); Celotex Corp.
v. Oil-Workers, 516 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1975); Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1974).
The shorter time period for the effectiveness of temporary restraining orders prescribed by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act has also been adopted, Celotex Corp. v. Oil Workers, 516 F.2d 242
(3d Cir. 1975), but the "public officers" finding requirement of the Norris-LaGuardia Act has
been deemed to be "probably" inappropriate in Boys Markets cases. United States Steel
Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
The Seventh Circuit, however, in a dictum written by then-Judge Stevens, indicated that
Boys Markets itself suggests that all of the procedural requisites of § 7 are inapplicable.
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conf. of Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972, 975-76 n.8 7th Cir.
1973). A district judge has held § 8 inapplicable to Boys Markets cases, Latrobe Steel Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 405 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 545 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1976), an issue raised before the trial judge in Buffalo Forge
but not resolved because of his denial of the injunction on other grounds. See 517 F.2d at
1209 n.3.
"I See Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1963);
Developments in the Law-Injunctions,78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1058 (1965).
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should be a sufficient safeguard against the status quo order becoming, in effect, a final determination of the right to strike or respect
a picket line. The restraining order preserving the status quo can be
made expressly dissolvable upon a showing of employer delay in
adhering to the order for expedited arbitration. The injunction can
require the arbitrator's award to issue immediately after an expedited hearing, with a written decision to follow later. The trial court
can also direct the arbitrator to decide whether further or additional
coercive relief against the work stoppage is warranted, with any
such award enforceable in confirmation proceedings." °' The concern
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act that status quo orders remain in effect
for only a limited period of time can be served by tailoring the
injunction to expire at the conclusion of an appropriate period, with
extensions granted only for good cause, such as dilatory tactics on
the union's part, or exceptional circumstances excusing the parties
from completing their case presentations in the period established
by the order.
The real issue then turns on the propriety of an order enjoining
a strike alleged to be in breach of an express or implied no-strike
obligation and restoring the status quo pending arbitration, requiring in effect that the union establish its contractual right to strike
in arbitration prior to exercising that right. By restricting Boys
Markets relief to situations where a breach-of-contract strike arises
over an arbitrable dispute, the majority in Buffalo Forge avoided
this issue. Justice Stevens alluded to the propriety of a status quo
order when he referred to the traditional labor-management relations maxim that the party seeking arbitration must accept the
condition of which he complains pending the arbitrator's decision." 9
The maxim, he noted, is grounded in the need for production to
continue," 0 and usually benefits the employer because unions and
employees are frequently the complaining parties. The policy supporting the maxim, if not the maxim itself, undermined the union's
contention that it should be permitted to disrupt production pending the arbitrator's decision on the no-strike clause issue.
Furthermore, in Gateway Coal the Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's order requiring the employer to reestablish the status
quo-suspension of the foremen whose presence constituted an alleged safety hazard-as a condition of granting injunctive relief. If
I" See, e.g., New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389 F.2d
369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968). See also Gould, supra note 4, at 244-50.
'" 428 U.S. at 425.
' Id. at 427 n.21; see also Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. 779 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.).
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equity is authorized to require the status quo of employers, it should
be empowered to impose similar restraints on unions."'
In essence, the limited form of relief suggested here would provide arbitrators with an atmosphere free from economic pressure in
which to resolve knotty issues concerning whether the grievancearbitration provisions of particular contracts can be read to imply
no-strike obligations, and whether the parties' contractual prohibition of strikes extends to sympathy strikes or picket line respect.
Consistent with the conventional presumption in favor of arbitrability of labor disputes, injunctive relief would be inappropriate only
if it could be established that the parties either expressly excluded
sympathy work stoppages from the no-strike clause or unambigously excluded no-strike issues from their grievance-arbitration
procedures.
Finally, the Buffalo Forge majority's fear that allowing injunctions of strikes in breach of contract pending arbitration would inundate the federal courts with preliminary injunction litigation
seems particularly questionable." 2 The argument against injunctive
relief in this context is often put the other way around: enjoining
breach-of-contract strikes does not contribute to the goal of industrial peace because these strikes account for such a small proportion of the man-days idled each year by labor disputes." 3 Enjoining
"IIn Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union No. 18, 471
F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973), the court vacated on other grounds
the trial court's issuance of an injunction enforcing a status quo provision in the collective
bargaining agreement against the employer, but indicated its decision was without prejudice
to any future proceedings to enforce the status quo pending an arbitrator's determination of
the applicability of the clause. See Gould, supra note 4, at 239-44, concluding that in exceptional circumstances courts issuing Boys Markets injunctions possess the power to reinstate
the status quo pending arbitration. But see Transit Union Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 43 (1976). In its original
opinion the Ninth Circuit upheld the issuance of a preliminary injunction requiring the
company to maintain the status quo by not implementing changes in work schedules pending
arbitration of a union grievance challenging these changes. After the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Buffalo Forge, however, the court reversed the
trial judge's injunction, emphasizing the absence of a specific contractual provision requiring
maintenance of the status quo by the employer pending arbitration and concluding that the
implication of an employer obligation to preserve the status quo would be improper where
the employer's action did not threaten to frustrate or interfere with the arbitration process.
Transit Union Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1977).
112 Alleviating the burdens on the federal judiciary by limiting access to the federal courts
finds expression in other decisions issued during the 1975 Term. See Stone v. Powell, 423 U.S.
817 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (restricting the availability of federal
habeas corpus relief).
HI H. WELLINGTON, supra note 33, at 117-19 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics data on
work stoppages for 1961 and 1965). See also Vladeck, supra note 10, at 93; Dunau, supra note
10, at 465.
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such conduct may even be counterproductive, it is argued, because
when a strike in breach of contract does occur, feelings run so high
that an injunction will not change matters.' More refined data on
work stoppages than those relied on by the Court indicate that half
of all breach-of-contract strikes occur in two industries-mining and
construction-and that breach-of-contract strikes represent onethird of all work stoppages in the country."15 Nevertheless, because
almost all collective bargaining agreements include grievance procedures culminating in arbitration, most breach-of-contract strikes
would probably be enjoinable under existing Boys Markets standards.116 Thus the data do not suggest that expanding the Boys
Markets remedy to include specific performance relief pending arbitration would inundate the federal courts with massive preliminary
injunction litigation.
C. Injunctive Relief and "Employee-Oriented" GrievanceArbitration Procedures
One of the most serious shortcomings of the majority opinion
in Buffalo Forge was the failure to analyze fully the grievancearbitration procedure provided in the parties' bargain. That failure
resulted in the unsupported assertion that the employer could compel arbitration of its breach-of-contract claim even though the grievance procedures preliminary to arbitration were "employeeoriented""17 and excluded employer claims of contract breach. If
Boys Markets injunctions may be granted to employers in cases in
which grievance-arbitration procedures are "employee-oriented,"
Buffalo Forge may have sub silentio, and apparently unintentionally, overruled Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co."' In that case the
Supreme Court held that an employer's section 301 damage action
would not be stayed pending arbitration where an "employeeoriented" grievance procedure denied the employer the right to initiate the grievance-arbitration mechanism.
Employers have sought to incorporate "employee-oriented"
H. WELLNGTON, supra note 33, at 117-19.
Analysis of Work Stoppages, 1971, Dep't of Labor Bull. No. 1777, at 5, 23-24 (1973);
Analysis of Work Stoppages, 1973, Dep't of Labor Bull. No. 1877, at 16 (1975).
"I About 96% of collective bargaining agreements contain procedures providing for arbitration of contract disputes, although many arbitration provisions exclude certain types of
disputes from arbitral resolution. See 2 BNA, CoLcnva BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CON"'
'

Tncrs, BASIC PATrRNS IN UNION CoNrRAcrs, 51:6 (1975).
I" See text and notes at notes 52-53 supra.
"' 370 U.S. 238 (1962); see note 54 supra.
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grievance procedures in bargaining agreements "9 not only to prevent
stays of damage actions pending arbitration, but to negate any implication that employees or a union can erode management's right
to issue work orders. When the employer has been denied access to
the grievance procedure he is not required to secure a determination
by an arbitrator that a disputed work order was proper under the
bargaining agreement before insisting on obedience to the order.
This principle, too, appears threatened by the majority's analysis of
the applicable bargaining agreement in Buffalo Forge.
If the parties have clearly excluded employer claims of breach
of contract from the grievance-arbitration procedure, enjoining the
work stoppage at the request of the employer and requiring arbitration of the strike issue contravenes the parties' bargain. Even
though the employer who resisted arbitration of strike claims at the
bargaining table is now seeking the order compelling arbitration,
and the union, which probably demanded arbitration of strike
claims initially, now resists, to permit the employer to invoke the
2
arbitral process offends notions of freedom of contract.'
On the other hand, when the employer, as well as the employees
and the union, may invoke the grievance procedure, specific performance of no-strike obligations coupled with an order to arbitrate
the strike issue does not run afoul of the collective bargaining agreement' 2' and is consistent with Atkinson v. Sinclair on the damage
action side of section 301. In view of the significant policy considerations favoring injunctions enforcing no-strike obligations, such a
limited remedy constitutes a more appropriate accommodation of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 301 than the resolutions of22
fered by either the majority or minority opinion in Buffalo Forge.
,,9 According to one survey, in 1975 approximately 26% of the collective bargaining
agreements in manufacturing industries and 23% in nonmanufacturing industries contained
grievance-arbitration provisions permitting employers to file grievances. 2 BNA, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 51 (1975). The
comparable percentages in 1971 were 16% for manufacturing industries and 14% for nonman-

ufacturing industries. 2 BNA, CoLLEcTv BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS, BASIC
PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 51 (1971).
110H. WELUNGTON, supra note 33, at 112-17 (1968); see also United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975) (trial court's issuance of a Boys Markets injunction was
improper in part because only a union or individual grievance against an employer, and not
an employer grievance against a union, was an appropriate predicate forBoys Marketsrelief).
"I1See, e.g., Johnson Builders, Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1095, 422 F.2d
137 (10th Cir. 1970) (affirming a stay of an employer § 301 action where the employer had
access to the contractual grievance procedure).
"2 Unions would not be required to assume the risk of calling a potentially illegal strike
to force the employer to commence the arbitral proceeding. Upon the establishment of a
foreign picket line, for example, the union, instead of authorizing picket line respect, could
demand that the employer initiate the grievance-arbitration mechanism to determine
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Under the proposed remedy, a court would do no more than act in
that proaid of the grievance-arbitration mechanism by requiring
1 3
duction continue pending the arbitrator's award. 1
Application of the suggested remedy is concededly more difficult in cases like Buffalo Forge where both the company and the
union possess a right to appeal to arbitration, but only employees
can initiate the grievance procedure. Because both parties have
access to the arbitration mechanism, one could argue that an order
requiring arbitration of the no-strike issue is less offensive to
freedom-of-contract ideals than a similar order where the employer
is denied a right to appeal to arbitration. By permitting the employer to appeal to arbitration, the parties may have intended to
allow employer claims to be submitted at advanced stages of the
grievance procedure, or to be submitted directly to arbitration. The
ambiguity over whether the employer is in fact excluded from arbitration is best resolved by an order enjoining the alleged breach-ofcontract strike and compelling arbitration, with the proviso that the
injunction will automatically dissolve upon the arbitrator's ruling
that the employer had no right to present breach-of-contract claims
to arbitration.
V.

ENJOINING AcTivrrY ARGUABLY PROTECTED BY THE

NLRA

The refusal of both the majority and the dissent in Buffalo
Forge to sanction a prearbitration injunction remedy in the context
of sympathy strikes or refusals to cross picket lines may stem from
an unarticulated reluctance to threaten time-honored traditions of
the union movement or to interfere with activity that may be
"protected" by the National Labor Relations Act.
whether picket line respect is covered by the scope of the no-strike obligation. An employer's
unwillingness to invoke arbitration when the union has refrained from striking should defeat
any subsequent request by the employer for an injunction restraining the picket line respect.
This conclusion comports with § 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, insofar as that provision is
applicable to Boys Markets relief. See note 106 supra. Normally, an employer's request for
Boys Markets relief and an order compelling arbitration should satisfy § 8's requirement of a
reasonable effort to settle the dispute by arbitration. Evidence of unwillingness to proceed to
arbitration, however, could demonstrate noncompliance and be grounds for denying relief.
See Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Local 886, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 572, 580-82 (10th
Cir. 1975); Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975),

vacated and remanded, 428 U.S. 906 (1976), ruling that an employer would not be permitted
to abandon its demand for arbitration after issuance of a Boys Markets injunction.
12 The conventional precondition to the right to maintain court action-that a party
exhaust contract remedies or demonstrate that it has been prevented from doing so by factors
outside its control, Republic Steel Co. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)-is satisfied because
the work stoppage itself prevents the employer from exhausting the contract remedy while
production continues.
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After vacillating,' 24 the National Labor Relations Board has
incorporated into the NLRA the notion that "[flrom the point of
view of union morality, a good union man never crosses a picket line,
no matter whose picket line.' 25 The Board has ruled that, unless a
governing collective bargaining agreement provides to the contrary,
respecting the picket line of another union at another employer's
premises is "protected" activity.' 2 The discharge of an employee for
refusing to cross a picket line interferes with the employee's right
under sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA to engage in concerted
activities for "mutual aid or protection and to assist labor organizations,"' 1 and it violates section 8(a)(3) by discriminating against
employees "in regard to hire or tenure of employment" to discourage
28
union membership.'
2I Compare Cyril de Cordova & Bro., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950) (refusal to cross is
"protected"), with Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953) (refusal to cross constitutes
insubordination justifying discharge); compare Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208
(1961) (refusal to cross constitutes "unprotected" activity justifying discharge, and § 502 is
not applicable because employees were not faced with "abnormally dangerous working conditions"), with Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced sub nom. Teamsters
Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied 377 U.S. 905 (1964) (resurrecting Cordova and concluding that activity is "protected" but permitting "replacement" of the
employee refusing to cross the picket line if "business justification" for "replacement"
proven). For a discussion of the early Board cases, see Kennedy, The "Right" to Refuse to
Cross a Picket Line: Limitations Imposed by Courts and Legislation, 2 ST. Louis L.J. 66
(1952); O'Connor, Respecting Picket Lines:A Union View, 7 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 235 (1951);
Petro, NationalLabor Policy and Respect for Picket Lines, 3 LAB. L.J. 83 (1952); Thatcher
& Finley, Respect for Picket Lines, 32 NEB. L. REV. 25 (1952).
'2 J. BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS m ACTION 129 (1948). But see Raskin, Is the Picket Line
Obsolete? SATURDAY REVIEW/WORLD. Oct. 19, 1974, at 12-17.
,2I Redwing Carriers, Inc. 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced sub nom. Teamsters Local
79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
' Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities . ...
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 8(a)(1) provides, "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) (1970).
11 Section 8(a)(3) provides, "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). See section 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970), which reads in
part:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection [section 8(b)(4)] shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any
employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged
in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this subchapter ....
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The "protected" right delineated by the NLRB is not absolute.
Under the doctrine of Redwing Carriers,Inc. 12 9 employees engaging
in sympathy strikes by respecting picket lines assume the status of
economic strikers, and if business efficiency demands it, an employer may "replace"-not "discharge"-such an employee. 3 ' Furthermore, the Board's willingness to recognize a protected right to
refuse to cross a foreign picket line has met resistance in the appellate courts, especially in cases where collective bargaining agreements contain no-strike obligations expressly or impliedly waiving
the right to respect picket lines. 31' Although purporting not to promulgate any "sweeping abstract principles," the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co."12 refused to accept the
Board's complete disregard of the governing collective bargaining
agreement's no-strike provisions in finding an employee's refusal to
cross a picket line at the premises of another employer "protected."
1" 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), enforced sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d
1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
'3 Under established NLRB doctrine employees engaging in an economic strike may be
permanently replaced but not discharged by their employer. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The distinction in the context of respecting picket lines is nearly
incomprehensible. Reviewing one version of this dichotomy, the Supreme Court commented:
"The Court of Appeals said, 'We cannot follow the Board's reasoning.' Nor can we." NLRB
v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953).
In assessing "business justification" the Board inquires whether the "replacement" occurred "immediately" or within "a short period after" the replaced employee's services were
terminated, whether the loss of production will likely result in a loss of a substantial customer, whether other employees or supervisors who would cross the picket line are available
to perform the work, and whether the respecting employees, can perform other work not
involving crossing the picket line. See Newberry Energy Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1976);
Overnite Transp. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 691 (1974); Overnite Transp. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 515
(1974); Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503 (1971). See generallyHaggard, Picket
Line Observance as Protected Concerted Activity, 53 N.C.L. Rav. 43 (1974). Cases prior to
1970 are collected and discussed in Carney & Florsheim, The Treatment of Refusals to Cross
Picket Lines: "By-Paths and Indirect Crookt Ways," 55 CoRNuL L. REv. 940 (1970).
M3'
See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v.
L.G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951). For cases agreeing with the Board's interpretation
that the no-strike obligations in the applicable agreement did not prohibit picket line respect,
see Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972); General
Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1971); Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB,
441 F.2d 499 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971). One court has decided that "[o]ne
who refuses to cross a picket line by reason of physical fear does not act on principle. He
makes no common cause, and contributes nothing to mutual aid or protection in the collective
bargaining process." Thus the activity was not protected. NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440
F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). See also G & P Trucking Co. v. NLRB,
539 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1976). See generally Connolly, Section 7 and Sympathy Strikes: The
Respective Rights of Employers and Employees, 25 LAB. L.J. 760 (1974).
'- 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953), affirming on other grounds 197 F.2d 111 (2nd Cir. 1952),
denying enforcement of 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951).
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The Board had apparently conceded that the provisions of the bargaining agreement would establish a complete defense to the unfair
labor practice charge, 133 but it had ruled that the entire contract was
null and void for the purposes of its proceeding because the contract
contained an illegal union security provision. The Supreme Court
held that the no-strike clause was severable from the faulty security
provision, and found on an independent review of the record that
the no-strike clause was intended to cover employee refusals to cross
picket lines. 134 The employee's discharge was therefore not an unfair
labor practice.
While conceding that the "protected" right to refuse to cross a
picket line may be properly waived,3 5 the Board has been reluctant
to find a waiver in the mere presence of a collectively-bargained nostrike clause without additional evidence that the parties intended
the no-strike obligation to cover sympathy strikes or refusals to cross
picket lines. 3 The Board's position is illustrated by the recent case
of Gary-Hobart Water Co."' When the case first came before the
Board, it applied the Collyer 38 doctrine, ruling that the question
whether the right to engage in picket line respect was waived by a
no-strike clause was so intertwined with the interpretation of the
parties' contract that the policies of the NLRA would be best effectuated by deferring to the contractual grievance-arbitration machinery for a decision.3 9 When the employer refused to arbitrate, how-

See 345 U.S. at 76.
The Court cited in support of its ruling NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939),
which held that it was not an unfair labor practice. to discharge employees who struck in
breach of contract. 345 U.S. at 80.
"I Keller-Crescent Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 685, 687 (1975), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976). But see NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974)
(ruling that employee § 7 rights to distribute literature in nonwork areas during nonwork time
on the issue of union representation or nonrepresentation could not be "waived" by bargaining agreement provisions).
"3 See, e.g., Kellogg Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 748 (1971), enforced, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972). But see Alliance Mfg. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 697 (1972) (adopting
administrative law judge's ruling that refusals to cross a picket line at the employees' place
of employment were unprotected because prohibited by a collectively bargained no-strike
clause). See also Carney & Florsheim, supra note 130, at 959-61.
1- 200 N.L.R.B. 647 (1972), decided on the merits, 210 N.L.R.B. 742 (1974), enforced,
511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975).
'3
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), ruled that where a dispute between
the parties raises both contractual and unfair labor practice issues, but essentially concerns
the meaning of the contract, the Board should defer unfair labor practice proceedings pending
submission to, and resolution of the dispute by, an arbitrator, provided the arbitration can
provide an appropriate arid full remedy for the alleged contract violation. But see note 155
infra.
'3' Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 200 N.L.R.B. 647 (1972). See also Diamond Nat'l Corp.,
197 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972).
'
'
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ever, the Board took the case again 4 and was forced to resolve the
question on the merits.
The production and maintenance employees had struck at the
expiration of their bargaining agreement and had established a
picket line in support of their demands. The clerical employees,
governed by an unexpired collective bargaining agreement that prohibited "strikes, slowdowns, or other interruptions of work," refused
to cross the production and maintenance employees' picket line.
Observing that the right to honor a picket line is "protected" but
may be waived by appropriate provisions in a bargaining agreement, the Board concluded that the broad no-strike provision did
not waive the employees' right to respect the picket line.
The Board majority's analysis of the scope of the no-strike obligation rested on two arguments. First, the majority reasoned that
the no-strike obligation is only as broad as the scope of an agreement's grievance-arbitration provisions, citing Gateway Coal,
which, as the dissent properly noted,' involved a collective bargaining agreement without an express no-strike provision. Foreshadowing the Supreme Court majority's position in Buffalo Forge,'
the Board majority observed that picket line respect was not a work
stoppage caused by a grievance the parties were contractually
bound to arbitrate. It followed, according to the majority, that the
picket line respect was not a dispute cognizable under the
grievance-arbitration mechanism. Thus the picket line respect did
not fall within the scope of the no-strike obligation, and there was
no waiver of the protected right.'
The Board majority's second argument was that the parties'
bargaining history showed that the employer had proposed a provision, rejected by the union in the negotiations, that would have
specifically prohibited refusing to cross another union's picket
line.' From this, the Board concluded that the parties construed
1,0Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742 (1974).
Id. at 749; see text at notes 27-28 supra.
4 See text at notes 60-62 supra.
4 This analysis of the scope of a no-strike clause as dependent on the scope of the

"'

agreement's grievance-arbitration provisions was also utilized in Hoffman Beverage Co., 163
N.L.R.B. 981 (1967), and served as an alternative holding in Machinists Lodge 284, 190
N.L.R.B. 208 (1971).
"I The court of appeals in Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir.
1972), used bargaining history in a similar fashion to uphold the employer's interpretation of
a no-strike clause. The court found that union proposals to restrict the scope of the no-strike
clause were rejected by the company, indicating that the parties construed the broad nostrike clause as prohibiting picket line respect. See also Hearst Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. 1405
(1966), enforced sub nom. News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968). But see
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the existing no-strike provision to sanction picket line respect. 45
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the
Board's order and endorsed its reasoning.' The court, following the
Board majority, interpreted Gateway Coal to mean that absent expression of a contrary intention a no-strike obligation is only as
47
broad in scope as an agreement's grievance-arbitration provision.'
Since the arbitration clause subjected only disputes about the terms
and provisions of the contract to arbitration, and respecting another
union's picket line was not a dispute "arising under or in connection
with" the agreement, the picket line respect was "neither arbitrable
nor subject to the no-strike provisions.' 4 The picket line respect
was thus not prohibited by the bargaining agreement's no-strike
clause and was "protected" activity. The court found it was not
necessary to examine the bargaining history of the no-strike clause,
but that history "only reinforced" its conclusion that the right to
engage in a sympathy strike and to refuse to cross another union's
picket line had not been waived or otherwise prohibited by the
4
bargaining agreement. 1
Unquestionably, the bargaining history can be persuasive evidence of the intended coverage of a no-strike clause. But the reasoning of the Board majority and the court of appeals, premised on the
coterminous nature of the grievance-arbitration provisions and the
no-strike clause, was seriously flawed. Both the Board and the court
assumed that because picket line respect is not triggered by an
otherwise arbitrable grievance, a work stoppage of this nature presents no question "arising under or in connection with" the agreement as required by the arbitration clause. But the appropriate
question is not whether the sympathy strike or picket line respect
was caused by an arbitrable grievance, but whether such a work
stoppage is prohibited by the no-strike clause. Clearly, this is an
issue arising "under or in connection with" the interpretation of
part of the agreement-the no-strike clause. Therefore, it is a

Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972) (rejecting
the use of any extrinsic evidence of bargaining history as an aid in interpreting the no-strike
clause at issue).
"' 210 N.L.R.B. at 746. Applying the business justification doctrine of Redwing, the
Board also determined that the employer had not met its burden of showing a business need
for terminating the employees of the clerical unit for refusing to work, since two months after

their discharge fewer than six had been replaced. Id. at 746-47.
"I Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975).
117Id.

at 286-87.

M'Id. at 288.
1'Id.
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question subject to the conventional arbitration clause involved in
the Gary-Hobart case.
To a large extent the flawed reasoning of Gary-Hobartis attributable to the assumption on which the analysis rests-that the
scope of the grievance-arbitration provisions and the no-strike
clause are presumed to be coterminous. This presumption made
sense in the context of Gateway Coal, where the Court was concerned with a strike caused by an arbitrable dispute. Because the
employer had promised to arbitrate the dispute that triggered the
strike, the union was presumed to have promised not to strike over
such a dispute as part of the quid pro quo. In the context of a
sympathy strike or picket line respect, however, it is irrelevant
whether the dispute that precipitates the work stoppage is arbitrable. The dispute that causes the sympathy strike or picket line
respect does not arise between the sympathy strikers and their employer and is not covered by their collective bargaining agreement.
Thus the employer could not have agreed to arbitrate the precipitating dispute, and there is no ground for either implying or not implying an agreement not to strike as a quid pro quo.
The majority in Buffalo Forge implicitly recognized that the
scope of grievance-arbitration procedures and no-strike clauses
should not be presumed to be be coterminous in the context of
sympathy strikes and respect for picket lines. Although prearbitration injunctive relief against the sympathy strike was not ordered,
the majority ruled that the dispute over the scope of the no-strike
clause was arbitrable.15 Thus the Court left the arbitrator free to
construe the no-strike clause as prohibiting sympathy strikes, even
though the dispute that caused the sympathy work stoppage was
not arbitrable. In addition, Justice Stevens observed that in many
agreements the employer has agreed to mandatory arbitration only
in exchange for a no-strike clause that prohibits strikes over disputes that are not arbitrable. 51 This suggests that, unless the agreement specifically so provides, an otherwise unrestricted express nostrike clause should not be construed as coextensive with the scope
of grievance-arbitration provisions when the disputed issue concerns
the permissibility of a sympathy work stoppage.
428 U.S. at 410.
428 U.S. at 419 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing Feller, A General Theory of the
Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CAL. L. REv. 663, 757-60 (1973), which in turn relied on
Bureau of Labor Statistics studies showing that only 22.9% of no-strike clauses were expressly
limited to issues subject to arbitration. See Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grievance Procedures, Dep't of Lab. Bull. No. 1425-1, at 86 (1964).
"
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In construing the proper scope of a no-strike obligation, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was probably on sounder footing than the Seventh Circuit in Gary-Hobartwhen it reasoned:
Petitioners point out that there is no explicit reference [in the
agreement] to the crossing of picket lines and suggest initially
that language which in terms inhibits only a strike is not to be
read as restricting the observance of picket lines. But the practical relationship between work stoppages and the honoring of
picket lines is so well understood in the industrial climate that
we think that a clause of this kind using only the word 'strike'
includes plant suspensions resulting from refusals to report for
1 52
work across picket lines.
The conventional wisdom is that courts are not deprived of
section 301 jurisdiction to enforce a bargaining agreement when the
conduct involved is arguably within the protections or the prohibitions of the NLRA. 5 3 Unraveling the intricate and often subtle tapestry of Board law on the "protected" nature of sympathy strikes,
however, requires precisely the type of judicial intervention that
neither the policies of section 301 nor the Norris-LaGuardia Act
permit in connection with equitable relief. Nevertheless, courts
should not be reluctant to grant prearbitration injunctive relief
when a sympathy strike or respect for the picket line of another
union is the "arguably protected activity" in conflict with a bargaining agreement's no-strike obligation. As the Board itself recognized in the Gary-Hobartdecision,1 4 the existence and scope of the
"protected" right is so inextricably linked with the contractual obligations that arbitration is the preferred forum for untangling the
statutory and contractual issues involved. An injunction order en152News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see Montana-Dakota
Utils. Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 1972). Distinguishing Gary-Hobart and
Hyster Co. v. Employees Ass'n of Kewanee, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S.
910 (1976), the panel in NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976), determined that Buffalo Forge required that a different analysis be employed in unfair labor
practice cases involving picket line respect than in § 301 injunction proceedings. Adopting
reasoning similar to that suggested in the text, the panel also held that the scope of the
express no-strike clause should not be construed as coterminous with the grievancearbitration provisions in the collective bargaining agreement.
253 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); see William E. Arnold
Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress,
and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations (pt. 2), 59 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 289-92 (1959);
Sovern, Section 301 and the PrimaryJurisdictionof the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529, 559-61
(1963).
,54See text at note 139 supra.
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forcing the no-strike clause with the direction that an arbitrator
decide the question of the employee's right to respect the picket line
coincides with a determination that issues of this type may be appropriately resolved by arbitration. 5 5 In addition, referring the merits of the controversy over the scope of the no-strike clause to arbitration more fully comports with the judiciary's role in enforcing
bargaining agreements under section 301 by allowing specialists
chosen by the parties to resolve specific disputes about the content
of the parties' bargain.
In some circumstances, it should be noted, an employee's refusal to work in spite of a contractual no-strike clause will be protected for reasons unrelated to the scope of the agreement not to
strike. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,'5 5 for example, serious
employer unfair labor practices were held, in effect, to justify nonperformance of the no-strike obligation.' 57 Another example is where
picket line violence occurs, and individual employees attempting to
cross become apprehensive about their personal safety. Although
fear of a picket line may be deemed not to fall within the protection
of section 7,158 a no-strike clause otherwise governing the employees

might be preempted by the mandate of section 502 of the LMRA,'58
declaring refusals to work in the face of abnormally dangerous working conditions not to be a "strike." An invocation of section 502
must of course be supported by objective proof of abnormally dangerous working conditions in conformance with the guidelines established by Gateway Coal.'0
,5 But see General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1977), and Roy Robinson,
Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1977), where a sharply divided Board restricted the scope of its
Collyer doctrine by ruling that issues raised in § 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) cases
are not suitable for deferral to arbitration even though they arguably also involve contract
violations.
t- 350 U.S. 270 (1956); see Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective BargainingAgreements,
57 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15-18 (1958).
"I It should be noted, however, that serious employer unfair labor practices were not the
cause of the refusal to work in any of the picket line respect cases in which Boys Markets
injunctions were found to be appropriate prior to Buffalo Forge. For the Board's application
of the Mastro Plastics doctrine in an unfair labor practice case involving picket line respect,
see Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1976).
I" NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971).
'1' 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
", See Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, 520 F.2d 1220
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976), where an alternative ground for denying
injunctive relief was that the picket line and the threats of violence accompanying it created
an abnormally dangerous working condition. The Board discussed the application of § 502 to
threats of violence in Redwing Carriers,130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), finding insufficient objective evidence of an abnormally dangerous working condition to warrant invoking the protec-
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SYMPATHY STRIKES, RESPECT FOR PICKET LINES, AND UNION
RESPONSIBILITY

If a labor organization resisting Boys Markets relief cannot be
held accountable for the actions of its members because they have
acted contrary to its instructions, then a court's authority to enjoin
the action of individual employees over whom it may not have personal jurisdiction is called into question." ' Typically, an injunction
issued under the authority of Boys Markets will restrain not only the
labor organization but also its "officers, agents, representatives,
members and all persons acting in concert, aid or participation with
them.""' However, the presumption that the labor organization and
its members act in concert is frequently questioned in the context
of sympathy strikes or refusals to cross another union's picket line.
These forms of industrial action are often portrayed as consisting
solely of individual decisions taken as a matter of conscience contrary to the union's instructions, or as based on the fear that crossing a picket line may lead to violence.
Of course, if only a few employees respect a picket line and
production is not substantially affected, the employer's burden of
showing irreparable harm if the injunction is denied would seem
insurmountable. Injunctive relief could be denied for this reason
alone, with the employer limited to the remedy of discipline or
discharge of the employees involved." 3 However, where employees
engage in a sympathy strike or respect of another union's picket line
in breach of. a no-strike obligation, and irreparable harm to the
employer can be demonstrated, an injunction, if otherwise appropritions of § 502. Of course, where the "abnormally dangerous working condition" created by
the picket line is due to picket line violence or threats of violence, state court injunctions
against those engaging in violent picketing are not preempted, see San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 US. 236 (1959), and the anti-injunction provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act do not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions. 29 U.S.C.

§ 104(e) (1970).
"IA court has jurisdiction over an individual in a § 301 suit if the individual is a party.
See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). But it is impractical, if not impossible,
to join all the individual workers participating in a breach of contract strike as parties.
Consequently, an injunction order may not bind individuals not joined as parties unless they
are "officers, agents, servants, employees, [or] attorneys" of parties or are acting "in active
concert or participation" with parties and have actual notice of the suit. FED R. Civ. P. 65(d).
I Boy's Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 70 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3076 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (injunction decree).
'1 Whether individual employees who participate in an unauthorized strike are liable to
employers for damages was left unanswered in Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238,
249 n.7 (1962), and was resolved in favor of nonliability in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers,
452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971), noted in 86 H~Av. L. REv. 447 (1972); 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1657
(1972).
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ate, should issue against the union and its individual members,
despite any claims of union nonresponsibility.'"I
Outside the context of respect for picket lines, the issue of union
responsibility for unauthorized strikes by a substantial minority, or
even a majority, of its membership is not settled." 5 One body of
authority argues that absent a specific contractual provision imposing union responsibility for unauthorized strikes, liability for
"wildcat" walkouts should not be imposed because awarding damages would deplete the union treasury and the burden of liability
would destroy the union as an institution. 6' Opposed is a line of
authority drawing on common law agency doctrines and contending
that not to hold unions responsible for mass unauthorized actions
6 7
of their membership would destroy unionism by fostering anarchy.
" On remedies for wildcat strikes, see Spelfogel, Wildcat Strikes and Minority Concerted Activity-Discipline,Damage Suits and Injunctions, 24 LAB. L.J. 592, 611-15 (1973).
The Constitution does not confer an absolute right to strike or to engage in concerted refusals
to work. Assuming that irreparable harm to the employer by the refusal of a few individuals
to work could be shown, injunctive relief solely against the individuals who refuse to cross
picket lines but who do not sever their employment relationship would not seem to contravene
notions of due process or the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude, particularly when express or implied no-strike obligations govern. See Dorchy v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926). See also Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975).
10 See generally Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibility for Wildcat Strikes, 21 WAYNE
L. REV. 1017 (1975); Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the
NationalLabor RelationsAct, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 672 (1967); Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The
Unions' Narrowing Path to Rectitude? 50 IND. L.J. 472 (1975). The standard for assessing
union responsibility in § 301 actions is set forth in §§ 301(b) & (e)-incorporating ordinary
doctrines of agency-rather than § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which requires clear proof
of actual authorization or ratification after actual knowledge. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 736 (1966); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd by an equally
divided court on this issue, 361 U.S. 459 (1960); Central Appalachian Coal Co. v. UMW, 376
F. Supp. 914, 922-24 (S.D.W. Va. 1974); but see United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d
1249 (5th Cir. 1975) (suggesting that the company's burden of proof on the issue of union
responsibility should be greater in the absence of an express no-strike obligation and that a
series of past wildcat strikes might make it more difficult for a union to exculpate itself from
liability).
"I See, e.g., North Am. Coal Corp. v. Local 2262, UMW, 497 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1974);
Penn Packing Co. v. Meatcutters Local 195, 497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974); Harnischfeger Corp.
v. Sheet Metal Workers, 436 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1970); United Constr. Workers v. Haislip
Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
I" See, e.g., United States v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 96 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Ill.
1951); United States v. International Union, UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948), afl'd,
177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949). In Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), a § 301 damage action, the contractual
no-strike obligation was held to impose on the union by implication an affirmative obligation
to use "every reasonable means" to end unauthorized strikes. The decision has been criticized. Whitman, supra note 165; 89 HA~v. L. Ray. 601 (1976). But see Fishman & Brown,
supra note 165. In United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 548 F.2d 67, (3d Cir. 1976), the court
extended the Eazor analysis to an injunction action and held that an affirmative obligation
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Both of these extremes seem far-fetched. Putting aside speculation about impending industrial anarchy and the ultimate destruction of unions as institutions, it seems clear that the bargaining
agreement and the institution of collective bargaining would be
impaired by allowing the union to claim nonresponsibility. The institution of bargaining and the bargaining agreement have provided
unions with the means of resisting arbitrary and irrational employer
action. Permitting unions to plead nonresponsibility for the claimed
arbitrary and irrational mass actions of their members may in turn
encourage employers to react irresponsibly, frustrating and impeding the bargaining process. Moreover, in the context of a sympathy
strike or picket line respect by a substantial complement of the
bargaining unit, a claim of union nonresponsibility is not entirely
consistent with reality. As Justice Stevens noted in Buffalo Forge,
such activity may be adverse to the economic interests of the individuals engaging in it. In fact, sympathy strikes and picket line
respect by employees have been minimal, if not nonexistent, when
their labor organization declares that the line need not be respected
68
or is unworthy of respect.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court majority in Buffalo Forge failed to recognize that when the parties' agreement contains an unqualified nostrike clause, important goals of labor policy are served by enjoining
sympathy work stoppages pending expedited arbitration of the
scope of the no-strike obligation. Injunctive relief pending the arbitrator's decision would strengthen the bargaining agreement, encourage collective bargaining as an institution, and foster utilization
of the parties' dispute adjustment procedures. The remedy could be
tailored to avoid the pitfall of determining the merits of the controversy in an injunction proceeding in a manner that would render the
parties' own dispute procedures superfluous. An order preserving
the status quo pending an arbitral determination of an intertwined
unfair labor practice and contractual issue concerning the right to
engage in a sympathy strike or picket line respect would discourage
judicial intervention into the thicket of Board law. It would also be
consistent with the policies favoring labor arbitration developed in
section 301 cases.
to end an unauthorized strike was appropriate even though the no-strike obligation itself was
implied from grievance-arbitration provisions.
"I See Raskin, supra note 125, at 15.
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Enjoining Sympathy Work Stoppages

By declaring that the sympathy strike issue was arbitrable at
the employer's request when employer breach-of-contract claims
were excluded from the contractual grievance procedures preceding
arbitration, Buffalo Forge may also have the effect of foreclosing
judicial intervention into breach-of-contract strikes in section 301
damage actions. Such a result would be unfortunate from a policy
and a practical standpoint not only because the issue was not
argued in Buffalo Forge, but also because Atkinson v. SinclairRefining Co.'69 represents sound contractual analysis which has not
been seriously questioned. The relationship between a breach-ofcontract injunction remedy and access to arbitration should mirror
the relationship between an employer's section 301 damage remedy
and arbitration under Atkinson v.Sinclair.When the arbitral forum
has been made available to both parties, the merits of their controversy should be determined by an arbitrator, with the court intervening only to restore the status quo by specifically enforcing a nostrike obligation pending the arbitrator's award on the merits. In
contrast, when the employer's breach-of-contract claim has been
excluded from arbitration, the employer should be limited to the
damage remedy.
When equitable intervention is restricted in this manner, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act retains its vitality, depriving courts of authority to enforce no-strike obligations when the parties have not
provided for arbitral resolution of disputes over the application of
the no-strike clause. Confining the injunction remedy to disputes
subject to arbitration also commits to the bargaining process the
decision to make injunctive relief available. The parties, in determining which controversies between them are subject to arbitration,
will also determine the circumstances in which a remedy restraining
a strike in breach of contract pending arbitration is appropriate.

"1 370 U.S. 238 (1962); see text at notes 54 & 118 supra.

